Per the instructions in class, we'll return to the Berger and Malamud readings in our discussion next week. So if you had a lousy copy, you were too busy, or you just plain flaked out: go back and read those two provocative (and polemic) essays. Fresh copies are available via .pdf on the UAS Online course website or by e-mail from Kevin M, should you need them. We'll likely return to Grizzly Man a bit in discussion, so feel free to continue that discussion here; we'd prefer, though, that you situate it in relation to the arguments made in the readings.
Additionally, moving ahead, we'll spend some time working through two selections from Vicki Hearne's famous 1986 book Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name. As always, please post your questions, concerns, and musings here.
Jack
ReplyDelete“She wants me to believe that she believes I meant the stick rather than the dumbbell”
Perhaps only because it was written by a dog trainer do we see the belief that a dog possesses the capability of a ‘second-order’ intentional system. Watching our Bassett Hound tease our Lab relentlessly, I wanted to share similar thoughts weeks ago when the orders of the intentional system were introduced, however I think Dennett sent me off on another tangent that week. The discussion of breaking the dog to the leash was also counter to some previous readings. After 3 or 4 times of getting ‘dumped’, does Salty really stop to think about the CONSEQUENCES of her actions? Was this possible in previous readings? Certainly not those that prescribed to Descartes corporeal soul ideas. Adding another perspective thickened the soup. Vicki Hearne’s excerpts from Adam’s Task were good reads, as was Tom Regan.
What intrigued me the most about this week’s readings was Hearne’s perspective of the source of the discontinuity of animal rights thoughts, beginning in her training-lecture discussion from pg 10 of Adams Task in the first assignment, “…modern injunctions against anthropomorphism have as much of a heretic-hounding impulse behind them as any of the older ones.” (Off the top rope with an elbow to the head by Vicki). She let the reader almost immediately know what she believed the source of some misunderstanding was and filled in the blanks on pgs 47 & 48 for anyone still unclear:
“When God first created the Earth He gave Adam and Eve “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon earth.”
She then goes on to remind the reader the rest of the story – that Adam and Eve failed in obedience and therefore failed in authority. The result of course was that wildness was once again possible for the animals. She tells us though that “…before the Fall, all animals were domestic, that nature was domestic”. I don’t believe her choice of the word ‘domestic was simply to let the reader know that the animals answered to man. I think it was in line with Regan’s thoughts as well, that all animals should be granted animal rights, not just those that are domestic. Her argument for this is both strategic and clever. She tells the reader that anyone opposed to animal rights and/or the idea of the slightest animal intelligence is probably arguing from a religious perspective. However she later reveals that it is from that same perspective that we are told that it was man’s mistake in the eyes of God that resulted in most animals no longer being domesticated. Therefore anyone that believes that domesticated animals should have rights should believe that all animals should have animal rights – for God had intended all animals to be domestic.
There must certainly be a deeper meaning to the subsequent line offered on pg 48 – “The gap the dog insists on between us and the stick represents the gap between our ability to command, give advice and so forth and our ability to acknowledge the being of others.”
March 9, 2009
ReplyDeleteJohn S. Sonin
Eng. 419—Maier/Klein
Blog 8—Singer, Regan
It’s ludicrous to contend non-human animals have Rights if one is going to define Rights under social strictures—all these Rights are culturally inculcated throughout the human maturation process. Essentially, these instilled Rights are then the attributes/basis/pylons for social, cultural discord: Certainly between well defined cultures (opposing perceptions of human rights clash at borders of ideologies), but also within, for some residents either don’t believe or they refuse to recognize the limit of their reach.
Ultimately, any irrefutable Right I have is confined to the surface of my epidermis and anything beyond that restriction needs to be an intra-culturally negotiated accord. This is called the “social contract.” Intra-cultural concurrence is reasoned by laws of both private and public Rights therein. All inter-cultural interaction, however, must find agreement on these delineations, privately (personally) and socially (publicly), then must extrapolate upon those accords to define agreed Human Rights. Can we expect non-human animals to abide by anything that takes linguistics to accede?
When it comes to a conversation with non-linguistically-participating entities, whether they be non-human animals or incapacitated humans, no conversation can be had about Rights because the only way they are assumed is through the reciprocity of language. But once discovering those mutual Rights,, we can then assume they to be for all humans, cognizant or not.
For animals we can only talk about “welfare” and what is right; even in these cases, we need to agree on attributions which can’t be validated by our forefathers prognostications, but only those defined by what we recognize as inalienable to all Life. Maybe those set forth by a divine Father? This concept of a divinity is open for discussion in every disputing culture, and across the globe. We can only look inward without the filter of self will to discover what those are.
Existentionally, however, I believe—like the possibility of Chomsky’s grammar gene in which there is an ingrained organic propensity—that there is a “mutual symbiosis” gene that is articulated on the level of an entire regenerative autopoeitic biosphere—a mutual symbiosis that we find easy to refute for personal gain. I know, for myself, I didn’t feel “right” engaged in such self-service that diminished, demeaned or deprived others. And I’ll bet any entity feels less than okay engaged in this kind of systemically negative behavior; this is an honest look inward for inalienable Truth.
Whether the entity of concern—organic or inorganic—has interdependence with one or more other entities in a form that ranges from parasitical to symbiotic to autonomic (like a rock!), that entity must concur with other entities within its biosphere—even most parasites die with their host and only to become fodder for other growth. But both had a right to life while regenerative. We really can only talk about an entity’s right-of-existence. Are we not civilized?
Capital City Weekly (from capitalcityweekly.com)
ReplyDeleteIn response to "Contrast between human and animal behavior" (letter to the editor, March 4 CCW):
It is always interesting to think about behavioral differences among animals, and so as a biologist and animal ecologist, I enjoyed reading last week's letter about the life history of a species of penguin. I'm not going to comment on the author's opinions about abortions, or two female humans raising a child, or having babies out of wedlock. However, as a biologist I would be remiss if I didn't point out some misconceptions about animals that were implied in last week's letter.
First, there is no contrast between human and animal behavior, because humans ARE animals. A lot of people forget this, or deny it for various reasons, but we are a species of great ape. You're an ape, and I'm an ape.
Second, I do agree that there is contrast between human behavior and penguin behavior, but to imply that monogamy and complete dedication to offspring is the norm in the Animal Kingdom is incorrect. Monogamy is extremely rare among animal species; much more common are polygamy, promiscuity and serial monogamy, which still rear their heads even in human societies.
Third, lots of animal parents abandon their offspring in times of low resources. If an offspring-rearing partner bails, or it's a drought year and there isn't enough food, many animals will abandon their babies and wait for better years to try to raise offspring. Is this immoral? Who am I to say. My main point is that the way penguins do their thing is the exception. Sure, maybe penguins wouldn't go to Planned Parenthood. And if you don't like Planned Parenthood, you're free to choose not to go either.
Carolyn Bergstrom, Juneau
*to read the letter this is a response to:
http://www.capitalcityweekly.com/stories/030409/spe_401068936.shtml
This letter is not a direct response to the readings, but I thought it was a pretty great example of local opinion on the the roles of humans in the world and the role of animals to human morality.
One of the most controversial aspects of the human view on the role of animals to our societies is how we use animals to determine our personal and societal morals.
So many sayings and actions are justified by our proximity to the natural world (i.e. dog-eat-dog world -i initially typed dog-eat-god, analyze that one if you will) and it's interesting to note the opinions of other individuals.
Relating this back to the Berger and Malamund readings on zoos, morality and our sense of responsibility towards nature and the animal kingdom constantly leads people examining nature to find the answers to our moral questions. The conflict appears when you have people noting that "obviously" we are not animals and we have our own set of responsibilities to live by, and you have other people arguing that the behaviors of animals show a natural morality that is the highest we can be responsible for holding ourselves to.
Zoos and keeping animals locked up for us to view are also connected to the fascination with "wild" animal behavior. Even our challenges with handling questions of morality are reflected with the diffences between zoos.
For example, a lot of zoos market themselves a lot more in the direction of biology and the protection of species, while world wide, the size and scope of zoos varies so much that it's hard to even call them all by the same name.
In the very first chapter of Adam’s Task, entitled “By Way of Explanation”, Vicki Hearne brings into question the very sort of thought-conditioning I have felt myself experiencing throughout the course of this class. My entire life, I have never questioned animal consciousness; it simply existed in my mind, no doubt about it. I believed it with the same sort of self-evident fervor that some people apply to a belief in God, but only because I had never thought to question it (much the same as the devout, I think). Through my reading of Descartes, Dennett, Marks, Deacon and others, it was brought to my attention that the consciousness that I assumed might, in fact, not be so evident, that it might not exist. This realization has spurred countless conversations with friends and family in which I usually unload my recently acquired knowledge of vervet monkeys and the intentional stance, bee dances and laughter as communication, then ask them what they think of it all. Usually, I get the response that I myself felt at the beginning: “Wow, I never really thought of that”. And a conversation ensues.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I am disconcerted to find myself recently arguing on the side of the philosophers, citing the fact that animals do not seem to display third-degree intentionality, so they do not display consciousness. Only after I have said it do I ask myself, “So what?” Though the intentional stance is an interesting way to conceptualize consciousness, why should I be able to use it in an argument since it is not substantiated in any way? And this is exactly what Hearne seems to be calling into question: since we obviously have no idea what goes on in animal minds, why should anyone be able to speak conclusively about it, especially in vague philosophical terms? It is this very relationship between the philosophers and the trainers that has been bothering me this whole semester, but only by reading Hearne was I able to realize it.
-Tucker Campbell
John S. Sonin
ReplyDeleteIt's all about responsibility. Each of us are responsible for that which we impact. If we understand the workings of reality...we're responsible. Shit! Do I have to be Atlas? Maybe I can dupe someone else into carrying the Globe for a minute. Sure wouldn't be so heavy if everyone could share the responsibility with me.
Authority is a loaded word and I don’t know if Hearne did a good job of defining what she meant by it, though I eventually came to grasp what she meant. I understand it to mean something along the lines of what the animal trusts about us from the consistency of our actions. For instance, if I am walking through the hallway and a dog is in the way, it will move, because I am totally consistent in forcing it to move. If I jumped over it every time for some prolonged period of time, it would soon stop moving out of the way. But then if after my hopping around I suddenly wanted him to get out of the way, he probably would not. But I do not generally jump over a dog in the hallway and thus I have authority to ask it to move.
ReplyDeleteSo how does this relate to our relationship with wild animals? Especially those in National Parks, like Treadwell’s bears? We have been anything but consistent in our actions toward and our beliefs about wild animals. They cannot trust us to either be friendly or to shoot them. It is difficult to talk about Treadwell’s bears because bears, even in a wild state, show a curiosity/lack of fear and or aversion to humans. I have been followed and challenged by mother bears in remote areas of the Sierra and have had them flee in Utah’s La Sal mountains. The fact that the Katmai bears were so friendly with Treadwell (barring the man eater), and his relationship with them (a very honest and consistent one) led to a good relationship, though a fundamentally different one than Hearne’s with her Salty, leads me to believe that while a good relationship with wild animals is possible, it cannot be the same as the trainer/trained relationship.
The problem I think a lot of people have with Treadwell is that they believe that he was habituating bears to humans. But him and the bears is not the same as the animals of National Parks who are habituated by thousands of people, and they learn that people are good. I think that if I went up to Katmai and tried to do the same thing with those bears or the foxes they would give me a totally different reception than they gave Treadwell, because I haven’t built trust with them.
As I was rereading Berger and Malamud this week, I noticed a comment I had made in the margins next to Malamud’s claim: “This narcissistic strain implies that zoos are more about people than animals: it is in some way as if this spectator is finally looking at himself - seeking the spectacular beauty of life, her ultimately discovers an incarnation of his own reflection to be the most stunning of all” (228). Although I’m still grappling to come to grips with the entire statement, it did pose some interesting questions. If you try to tie it back to the beginning of his essay, the R-rated section, it would seem that zoos would, in a sense, be the ultimate form of self-love - that we essentially go to the zoos to make love to ourselves or just love ourselves. I’m not sure that I agree with this. I can remember how exciting my first trip to the zoo was when I was a kid and it really didn’t have anything to do with myself, and everything to do with new sights, sounds, and discoveries. On the other hand, it does seem that zoos marginalize animals in a way that I’ve never thought of before this article. And if marginalization is what happens, then what purpose do zoos serve? An acceptable dominance over nature? Or could it be as simple as bringing the wild into our daily lives, as fabricated it might be. The Grizzly Man provides a perfect example of it. We can’t all be Timothy Treadwell and escape from our daily lives into the wilderness for months at a time. And even if we could, those wild places would become filled with humans, essentially turning nature into a zoo. As much as Berger and Malamud would like to completely discredit zoos, in a way they serve the same purpose as Treadwell - to bring the message of an unfamiliar, often unreachable animal to the general population. Without seeing these animals and interacting with them some how (even if it is a fabricated tale of poachers and unprotected animals) people just don’t care. And if they don’t care, they’re not going to dedicate their time and resources to help protect them.
ReplyDeleteKathleen Arledge
ReplyDeleteHearne writes that “the trainers’ language was […] the right language, the philosophically responsible language” (14). I wasn’t sure how Hearne was defining ‘philosophically responsible’ but it seems like an argument for pragmatism. Hearne writes that the trainer’s anthromorphic descriptions of animals “make sense of the situation” (14). The trainer’s language allows him to accomplish more. It is true or accurate in the sense that it proves itself effective in the individual’s life, with no reference to an objective standard of truth. There is also, for Hearne, a sense in which the trainer’s language dictates the animal’s behavior. In this sense, too, Hearne seems to be following the ideas of pragmatism. William James writes that “there are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming.” James wrote partly in response to Clifford, who argued that we have a moral duty to base belief on inquiry and gathering evidence and to do otherwise, to form beliefs based on inadequate evidence, is immoral. I’m not sure if this is particularly helpful or relevant but considering the two—William James and William Clifford—brought up a couple of questions for me about how this sort of debate is structured. Is there only one appropriate way to discuss animal behavior? It seems like Clifford would argue that there is an attainable truth, one we will know once we’ve arrived at it and for James, the appropriateness would be reliant on the speaker and not any objective measurement of truth or validity. In James’ understanding then, the language of the philosopher or linguist and the language of the animal trainer, though in opposition, are both equally moral. Is this the sort of thing we can know with certainty and will we know for certain that we’ve arrived at 'the truth of the matter'? Is this a question which science can answer definitively or is this a different sort of question? Is it really moral to form beliefs based on our need of them rather than relying on evidence? That was sort of disjointed, but a lot of Hearne's argument seemed closely aligned with pragmatism.
I must say that I found this week’s reading to be quite agreeable and thoroughly enjoyed reading it. Concept! And I also have to say that I am quite excited that we have reached animal rights in the class. Now, the first thing that I liked about the Hearne reading was the way that she seemed to do a good job a considering her opposition fully before refuting them. Most admirable [soft applause]. Having gotten that out of the way let me move on to her argument. I have always had a passion in concern to arguing about animal right and the like, and I have always considered it to be a general rule to always treat my pets in accordance with that wonderful oldie, the golden rule. So I am admittedly quite biased in to topic of animal rights. Anyway, one thing that really struck me when reading Hearne was her comparisons between animal right and black/women rights. I will admit that I never really considered comparing the two, sex/race and animals, but I think that Hearne did a very good job at presenting her argument. Although I wish we could see the rest of this book! I found myself nodding or smiling while I was reading “All Animals Are Equal…” however, the same is not true for “How to Say ‘Fetch.’”
ReplyDeleteThe clock just hit four so I’m not going to babble here as much. Even though I generally agreed with what was said in “How to Say ‘Fetch’” here I do not think that Hearne did the best of jobs at arguing on whether or not we can say “sit.” I found myself wondering about Salty and where this anecdote came from. Is this real? Or just some imagined scenario? But that is somewhat beside the point. Where does authority (aside from the making of laws and the like) come into the discussion of animals rights? I had trouble connecting the two or better yet following Hearne’s trail of thought.
Oh, I forgot. Here are a few site I found that show the relative ranking of laws in the US concerning animals. I thought they were interesting and surprising.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.aldf.org/article.php?id=786
http://www.pet-abuse.com/pages/cruelty_laws.php
Sorry about the tripple post but apparently I made a mistake and wrote down the wrong names onthe wrong handouts so the wonderful "Hearne" reading that I was refering to was really Peter Singer. But that totally explains the cunfusion I had with the connection of ideas which in affect completely negates my post. Opps.
ReplyDelete