Per our usual routine, please post your questions and 20-minute responses to this week's reading under the comments section here. Per Kevin K's suggestion in class two weeks ago, this might be a good venue to make public some of the anecdotal outside sources that come up in discussion, too.
READING UPDATE: (In case you didn't already get this e-mail from Kevin K...)
Here is an update on today's reading. In Chapter 2 of Dennett's Intentional Stance, only read to page 35 (the photocopier accidentally included an extra 5 pages -- 37-42). Then read chapter 7 pages 238-260. Then read the "Reflections: Interpreting monkeys..." section. Also read the short Deacon section on vervet monkeys ("In Other Words" appears as a subtitle on the first page). Do not worry about reading Nagel's "What is it like to be a Bat" or the related Dennett reply. We will not get to it tonight. I hope your reading is going well, see you in class tonight.
Kevin
Are Some Humans Genetically Predisposed to Needing Religion
ReplyDeleteJack Christiansen
Two questions came to mind after this week’s readings. The first is ‘are some humans genetically predisposed to need religion’, and the second was to apply Dennett’s ‘orders of intentional system’ to my dogs due to the frequent application of critical thought criteria to dogs in the classroom discussions. I will probably make the later another post to avoid confusion.
In our first reading – ‘True Believers’, the author discusses beliefs and desires on page 21 – specifically that we can believe a specific sentence to be true, and occasionally we may actually want that sentence to be true. The author expands this into a discussion of ‘perfect rationality’ in the next paragraph when he states that we should start with the assumption that people believe all the implications of their beliefs and believe no contradictory pairs of beliefs…….
This has a direct application to people’s religious beliefs – the stronger the beliefs, the more applicable this logic. People tend to surround themselves with others sharing similar beliefs and most certainly try to avoid prolonged contact with those having very contradictory beliefs. Religion exists in some form in almost every culture, and evidence of ‘religion’ dates to some of the earliest archeological findings. It would seem reasonable that to maintain a successful stature within any of our possible ancestral groups, religious beliefs and perhaps even a ‘mate-selection’ process that took into account those beliefs is almost a certainty. Religion was part of the group’s culture and their human behavior.
I would argue that the ‘Intentional System’ theory could be applied here. Our ancestors had developed patterns in their human behavior that were describable from the intentional stance….and supported generalizations and predictions (page 25). It could also be said that through this process they had developed their cultures, of which their religious beliefs played an important role.
Last week we revisited Marks’ claim that humans evolved and so did human behavior. ‘IF’ human nature is from culture AND culture influences evolution as Marks believes, than religion has influenced evolution due to its strong cultural role due to the desire to select mates with similar belief systems. This would have resulted in the selection of traits necessary to need/desire religion, a selection process that is still in progress today among many cultures.
Robert Locke
ReplyDeleteCritical Perspectives of the Animal
11 February 2009, 20 Minute Write
I am at a total loss when it comes to this “Intentional Stance.” I do fallow a little about some of what is being presented, I think. I am not sure what is meant the “logical test for referential opacity” when it comes to the congnitivists.
That being said I feel that I do have a very foggy idea of the order of intentional systems. The case of the vervet monkey whose side was losing ground call a “false alarm” in order to regain territory lost.
I am also fascinated by the idea of the “boy who cried wolf” and thus producing a “credibility gap.” I am not sure if I fully understand the mechanics of how this would work, yet I do have some gut feel on how and a little of the why it would work. I do fallow some to the p’s imply q’s and so on. Maybe a truth table would help out some how?
I am also very pleased with the author when he finally acknowledge his short comings about how to do an experiment, yet never going out into the field and gaining the firsthand knowledge of the obstacles one is faced with. In some ways the author had his credibility question. You could almost say that he did not communicate his idea well.
While I was reading I came to statement that I wise to call into question. In the 3rd reading, on page275, just about in the middle of the page, the author makes a claim of moving the monkeys into a lab and separation one from the rest and have him become a test monkey. The author claims that this monkey would be privy to and that he would know that the others would not have been shared this information. I would like to know how the author can make such a claim. Would it not also be reasonable to assume that the test monkey would think that his other captured kin were not being subjected to the same test?
Is language prerequisite to perception?
ReplyDeleteLast week's discussion—particularly about Helen Keller's experiences—got me thinking about the nature of perception and consciousness. Obviously one of the big things that allow us to think like we do is our large, powerful brain—we have the ability to form all sorts of memories and then draw connections between them (i.e. you can remember the consequences of an action or event and apply them to similar situations in the future), but as has been noted many times by the Kevins, computers can do this as well and they don't appear to be conscious, Hal 9000 notwithstanding.
So, at least in terms of our current understanding, our logical and associative abilities aren't what results in consciousness.
I find it incredibly interesting that Helen Keller, after learning language, admitted she couldn't really remember anything before then. And that got me thinking.
If we look at a computer, you see a number of components that are analogous to the human brain. A hard disk stores information (memory), RAM stores information for fast and easy access (short-term memory), a CPU processes information by activating and deactivating millions of tiny transistors (neurons), and you have some form of input—usually ethernet/modem, an optical drive, and a keyboard and mouse (the senses).
But all that fancy equipment is pretty much useless if you have no software installed. The human brain is pretty useless when it comes to academia if it hasn't been educated on a subject.
Deeper than that, though, is language. In order to program a piece of software, one must utilize a programming language. The clock on your computer is a product of language. So are your web browser, word processor, and World of Warcraft. Even further than that are your inputs—your computer needs the proper language to recognize the keys you press on your keyboard, the clicks on your mouse, and the DVD you just put into your DVD drive.
Obviously a computer isn't a human brain, and the two can't be compared since the brain doesn't even seem to work digitally. But the analogy is valid if we compare abstract concepts to software: without language, can you understand socialism? Can you visually picture literary analysis? How about the idea of germs? Of course we all can picture these somehow because we probably have images associated with the idea, but the images come after we already understand the idea, not before.
Therefore, I propose that language is the software of consciousness, so to speak. Language has tenses, which allows us to think in terms of past, present, and future, and the organize our thoughts around them. Babies don't think, "tomorrow I'll take a nap at 3:00 PM." They go to sleep when they're tired. As do all animals that don't have language.
The concept of self as well. We all are obviously constrained to our own senses, but with language we can assign a capital "I" to ourselves. With verbs, I can express what I do. Add in tenses and I can express what I have done, am doing, and will do. Add positives and negatives, and suddenly I can express what I should have done, should not have done, should be doing, should not be doing, etc.
If we add adjectives, then I can ascribe qualities onto myself. I am awesome. I was young once. I will be old.
Now I am a concept in my mind. Before I had language, there was no concept. There was an awareness of essentially what I desired (food, water, sleep, sex, warmth, etc.), and senses I could utilize to achieve those desires. But then I was programmed with a language, and suddenly I can conceptualize myself and, with the help of other nouns, everything else.
This is perception, the ability to interpret the world around us. My tea isn't just hot, it tastes good as well. The painting on my wall isn't just just colorful, it's beautiful as well. Kevin isn't just a man, he's rugged and masculine, too.
So I think we are, essentially, powerful computers equipped with a very complex language system that enables perception. This could easily mean consciousness is an illusion and we really don't have a choice in our actions (after all, who can say they've ever made a choice when they had more motivation to make a different choice?), and it also means that if we could emulate the human brain on a computer, we could easily create virtual people.
It all comes down to using the correct programming language. Maybe in the future, instead of C++, FORTRAN, Java, and PHP, computers will be programmed in English, Spanish, French, and Polynesian.
Of course this means that animals don't perceive the world as we do. Dogs may demand food or walks at a certain time of day, but this is due more to Pavlovian conditioning than any real concept of time on the dog's part.
Are we the only intentional systems?
ReplyDeleteWhen I first began reading Dennett and what he said about the intentional strategy, I thought he was crazy! He seemed to be blindly assigning beliefs to animals and even to inanimate things such as thermostats! But continuing on I realized he wasn't so much assigning "beliefs," but thoughts, sensations, and other devices of measurement and perception. Such as being hungry, or sensing danger. He classifies this as a "first-order" intentional system. One that, has beliefs and desires, but no beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires. That does not seem so far fetched.
From what we have read and discussed so far in class, I would argue that humans are the only known animals to act beyond a first order intentional system. Of course there are animals that appear to have more sophisticated systems. The case of the beavers constructing dams, mentioned in class comes to mind. The intricate, and presumably thoughtful enterprise of damn construction seems to be triggered by a simple response to stimuli (the sound of running water).
So we must be careful when freely assigning belief and desire to animals, for two reasons.
The first, because what may appear to be belief or desire may in fact be nothing more then instinct, pre-programmed action in response to a certain condition . Second, if the given creature is capable of belief, and desire, we can not fairly prescribe our own definition of the creatures purpose in order to determine its a. beliefs or b. actions stemming from those beliefs.(In other words, beliefs either do not exist in other creatures or are not of the creature itself, but rather its 'creator', or they do and in that case it is impossible for ourselves to prescribe our own meaning to them.) Just as we can not prescribe our own reasoning to another humans actions. We can't say that the reason a serial killer slaughtered hundreds of people was because he felt bullied when he was younger, yet this might seam like a likely reason. Honestly though, Who knows what might have been going on in his head.He may have believed any number of things, that he was saving his victims, or that "this was his purpose."
True, sometimes we create a reason for someones action and get it right. So too, may we guess the meaning of a "Call" given to a group of apes. But is that call uttered, due to a deep understanding of the eminent danger and a clear awareness of the other apes reaction? Or, is it more like the beavers building the damn?
-Taylor Manuel
Andy Lounsbury
ReplyDeleteThis is probably going to be pretty short, since Jack already touched on some of it and I’m on a rather short timeline. In True Believers the author (I can’t remember the guy’s name and I only have some notes in front of me, not the actual reading) says that we should “start with the assumption that people believe in all the implications of their beliefs, and do not believe in any set of contradicting beliefs”. To me, this is a rather stupid idea.
I’ll start with the first part—that people believe in all the implications of their beliefs. If that were true, the way I see it, then people’s beliefs would never change. If you believed in all the implications of, say, Christianity, then it would be impossible to become disillusioned with that belief system, which has obviously happened to hordes of people. Look at the multiple schisms in the church throughout history. Look at the massive conversions of people from one religion to another. It happens all the time.
Next up on the list is this notion that people don’t hold contradicting beliefs. I’m going to take this opportunity to suck up to Kevin and throw that Whitman quote out there I’ve heard him use so many times: “Do I contradict myself? Very well, I contradict myself.” People are absolutely full of contradictions, particularly when it comes to things like religion. I’m gong to try and stay away from things that might offend people or start a huge theological debate that I have neither the time energy nor desire to partake in. But a couple examples from the Christian religion, which is the one I’m most familiar with: all four accounts of the birth of Jesus contradict each other. The first two verses of Genesis state the God created life (plants, animals, humans) in opposite orders. I could go on for a bit, but the point is that contradictions are everywhere. That’s my little rant, and I’m not out of time. See you in class.
February 8, 2009
ReplyDeleteJohn S. Sonin
Eng. 418—Maier/Klein
Reading Bennet’s Reflections:… I was intrigued by his inspiring announcement of reculer pour mieux sauter. Doing a logic examination of “saltation” considering what I understand about the environmental impact of genetic attributes manifesting or expressing, like dominant right- or left-handedness, or their remaining latent, wouldn’t the chain of biologic evolution show no record if the animal or entity randomly exhibiting this expression of an attribute, never achieve reproductive capacity? Gene expressions don’t necessarily alter the underlying genes, only through somatic influence in consecutive generations would we see a phenotype difference. If that expression had proven through the generations beneficial we might find evidence of it in the historical record. If it weren’t an enhancement, any somatic change environmentally induced would rapidly regress in subsequent generations?
Somewhat like in grammatical evolution, compounding words like “heretofore” and “wherewithal” while leaving unique “before now” and “so it goes,” the minor adaptation may persist a generation or two building other enhancements, for everything in nature is always bubbling with new phenomenology, on top in the mean time which would have the chain appear to leap frog, no?
I won't try to comment on the overall piece, I wouldn't know where to start. I'll post piecemeal, based on tid-bits from the text.
ReplyDeletePage 25, True Believers, first paragraph, 3 last sentences in the paragraph. He refers to a scenario he has just given and states that there is "an arc of causation in space-time that could not be predicted under any description by any imaginable practical extension of physics or biology."
It's interesting to consider this statement, as it contradicts the notion that humans are merely biological machines of a deterministic nature. But if you come to this conclusion, it opens up more questions than you would have if you were to leave the statement alone entirely. Does this imply free will? If so, is this a common trait that humans share with other animals, or is it unique to us and us alone? If it does not imply free will (which is also, arguably the case) who or what is pulling the strings and how?
Another interesting entry is the following (True Bel., pg. 27, first paragraph):
"Fatalists - for instance, astrologers - believe that there is a pattern in human affairs that is inexorable, that will impose itself [i]come what may[i], that is, no matter how the victims scheme and second-guess, no matter how they twist and turn in their chains. These fatalists are wrong, but they are [i]almost[i] right. There are patterns in human affairs that impose themselves, not quite inexorably but with great vigor, absorbing physical perturbations and variations that might as well be considered random; these are the patterns that we characterize in terms of the beliefs, desires, and intentions of rational agents."
From what I can remember, this is similar to Nietzsche's ideas on the matter of free will. He believes that free will is only present in very small degrees. This also, given a certain subjective twist, mirrors the ideas that Isaac Asimov placed in his 'Foundation' series, that the less the mass of the body of study, the less predictable, the greater the mass of the body of study, the more predictable. This idea I find very interesting as it suggests a sort of inevitable guidance by some outside force that allows for small deviations (i.e. - acts of free will).
All of this reminds me of the only three arguments I have heard in reference to the creation and guidance of man and animal: Creationism, The The Morphogenetic Field Theory, The Big Bang Theory. Two of the three arguments logically make sense, the third, The Big Bang Theory, seems inherently flawed in that it violates the law of the conservation of energy.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteOn page 54 of the Deacon handout Deacon comments that “language is the dependent stepchild with very odd features” of the varieties of communication, then what does language do to culture when unaccompanied by it's non-lingual aspect?
ReplyDeleteIt is easily observed that in nature it is primarily the more complex organisms that exhibit signs of higher level communication skills (for example: dolphins and monkeys). These animals are also known for their exceptional intelligence (at least as far as intelligence can be measured by us in animals). It's reasonable to infer from this that greater 'intelligence' also suggests at least the capacity for a greater communication ability. But the environments these animals evolve in and we evolved from, language would have to arise as a partner with the animals already dominant nonverbal communication methods. But somewhere in our evolution, the balance between the two communication 'styles' flipped, leaving language as our dominant communication style. However, of course the non-lingual aspects remained, in perhaps a more subordinate role. To answer the question of what is lost in completely verbal or written communication as found in today's increasingly prevalent internet cultures, it is first necessary to at least develop an idea of what non-lingual communication accomplishes.
In animals, this communication would've primarily served their base needs. The things that evolution deemed the most important: the ability to survive and the ability to attract mates. Non-lingual communication's use in these is evident in the mating posturing of many species (ex: boby bird mating dances—highly specific dances preformed by male birds to attract females), and in the aggressive posturing that one might see in a predator defending it's kill. So when these non-lingual methods of communication are eliminated, are we sacrificing at least some of our ability to attract mates or survive in some way?
Perhaps I am misunderstanding something about Dennett’s intentional beliefs, but if a being can believe one thing, then I would make the assumption that they can inhabit all the different orders of intentionality. If you can think in a first order fashion, what stops you from going on to the second order and so forth? What I want to know is what makes us believe something in the first place? If vervet monkeys make certain calls only as a stimulus to Snake visual stimuli, then there is nothing about it that says smart monkey. That would only be the process of a machine. But I don’t think that this is the case. Vervet monkeys did not just pop into existence as machines that were designed to function in a certain way to snakes and leopards. At some time in the past, I am going to assume that the calls the vervet monkeys used were an adaption, in response to imminent danger.
ReplyDeleteNow two separate arguments could be formed now. Something that has been mentioned in the readings is determinism; for example the scientist making the claim that if he knew the position of every atom in the universe, he could predict every event perfectly. In such a universe, the things that you think are merely the product of physical interactions outside of your control. How does one have a thought, what is the purpose of a thought, if
Back to vervet monkeys. If the monkeys beliefs are more than a mechanistic by-product, we need to ask how does one acquire a belief? Do we think that we are smarter than vervet monkeys, and if so, what makes us and our beliefs, more impressive than the monkeys.
Jon Hays
While Daniel Dennett chose to treat the vervet monkeys as intentional systems (for the purpose of examining their supposed linguistic abilities), it brought to my attention the fact that this seems to be the overlying question of this class and animal studies in general: are animals intentional systems? Or are they simply reacting to a stimulus input in a predetermined way? Before doing all this reading related to our class, my natural inclination was to assume that animals were intentional, that they were thinking and rational and held beliefs and wishes. But after learning about some of the more seemingly complex and intentional functions of animals (bee dances and predator calls) only to find out that they are found to be quite automatic and instinctual developments in the nature of the animal, it is hard not to question whether animals are intentional or simply impulsive.
ReplyDeleteThe argument for pure impulsiveness has grown on me because it fits into what I perceive to be the most redeeming quality of wild animals: Their path of least resistance. In general, animals seem to find the easiest way to survive and follow that path for as long as it works. Unlike humans, they do not grow discontent or impatient or hopeful for different circumstances as long as they are healthy and reproducing. I am sometimes envious of this seemingly natural characteristic of other animals, since I am a strong believer that ignorance is bliss. And to be a non-intentional system is, if nothing else, to be ignorant. So, I am slowly beginning to consider that other animals may not be intentional, in which case, by it's very definition, language would certainly escape their realm of understanding, since they would not be able to construct a simple ordered-intentional system.
-Tucker Campbell
I do understand the idea of our use of our language attributing intentions to inanimate things (the thermostat wants the house to be warmer). I don’t know if I really understand the reason he brings this up. He also talks about lightning and the way the electrician “tricked” the lightning into striking where he wanted it too. It has no desire to destroy a house or a cow chained to lightning rod. You cannot trick lightning since it isn’t an intentional phenomenon, it has no intentions, it cannot formulate and communicate its intentions, it just strikes where the connection to something (usually the ground) is shortest. So how can he try to gain a philosophical understanding of the way the world (humans, animals, language) work by referring to an incorrect description of something like a thermostat or lightning? And even if you try to use this word usage to learn something about animals you fail. Al you learn about is man’s propensity for anthropomorphizing the world.
ReplyDeleteMaybe this isn’t what he is trying to do, but them I’m way off and have no clue whatever about what he’s talking about.
I find it interesting that in an earlier post it is claimed that the sense of self does not arise prior to language. It sounded very nice, but it is lacking in evidence and is not intuitively obvious.
ReplyDeleteAnother item: Pavlovian conditioning doesn't seem to have much to do, at all, with a dog's demanding food and walks at specific times of the day. Pavlov's studies introduced the concept of association, in other words, the linking of two stimuli, given in quick succession, together. An internal clock, or awareness of daily durations, is not in and of itself a stimuli at all. Unless of course, you meant to say: a dog demanding a walk upon the arrival of the owner coming home from work, and the subsequent demand of food after the walk.
20 Minute Discussion #4
ReplyDeleteI’d like to react to Josh’s post, if I could. Reading it, I noticed myself nodding and thinking, “yeah, that’s right” almost the whole way through, but I use that same line of thought to come to a totally different conclusion.
Because you claim that babies don’t set a nap time and instead sleep when they’re tired because they don’t have language, I take it that you think that language is an acquired trait that is necessary to thought. Here, I am tempted to plug this into Sarte’s observations. Couldn’t we conclude from this that when you are a child you merely exist, and your essence – as you say, your consciousness or perception – is acquired after?
I think that this observation is further enhanced by your discussion in the following paragraph when you talk about self-consciousness. You say that “Now [after acquiring language] I am a concept. Before I had language there was no concept.” It seems to me that you would necessarily agree with Sarte’s claim, then that “there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man…”
Sarte did not designate a specific time (like once language is learned) as the time when we acquire a perception, but the notion that perception is acquired seems similar all the same.
I struggle, then, to understand how the two of you start off so similar and come to such radically different conclusions. I agree with you in this sense: I think that it makes sense to distinguish language acquisition as the point where one transitions from existing to having an essence. Language seems necessary for thought and self-perception, which is what essence is all about. I fail, however, to think that “this could easily mean consciousness is an illusion and we do not really have a choice in our actions…” Alternatively, I think that it makes sense that when we gain perception or consciousness or essence, we gain choice in our actions. I diverge from you, also, when you say that “I think we are, essentially, powerful computers equipped with a very complex language system that enables perception.” I think that just because computers are the best means that we have of understanding the way that we work, is an insufficient reason to think that we are computers.
I’ll offer a possible explanation for the difference: computers don’t decide how to program themselves or how to use the programs on them – we do. Sure, when I shoot someone in a computer game, they require a language to make that happen, but without me at the helm, nobody is going to get shot (unless the computer game is programmed differently). It seems to me that when we program computers, we are God – in the sense that Sarte talks about, at least. We have a conception of what a computer should be and design the program to work as we want it to. To me, the only way that we can make the analogy in the way that you seem to, is if we acknowledge that something programming us and possibly controlling our actions – whether that be genetics or God.
I’ll give brief mention to genetics. Under your formula, we acquire language after being born, and language is necessary for thought. Genetics doesn’t explain this. We can’t say that genetics programs us like we program a computer because we acquire language later, whereas computer languages are hardwired in – by us.
As for God, I’ll merely say that God is incompatible with Sarte’s views – which I am a proponent of. I’d be happy to engage in a theological discussion later, but I don’t think that now is the time or the place.
What is the relevance of intentional strategy to animals?
ReplyDeleteIn this reading, the author explores the concept in intentional strategy and the limits of its powers of prediction. According to this reading a believer is "any object whose behavior is reliably and voluminously predictable via intentional strategy." Through the break down of the concept of belief, which determines the systems by which methods of prediction function, belief can be assigned to object and beings other than people.
What does this mean in regards to the human/animal dichotomy people have defined for themselves and assigned to animals? The importance of relativity is brought into focus- as object/creatures of belief, the idea that the actions of people as a whole can be systematically predicted with some limits suggests that we are at most more complicated systems than say animal or plants. And that this level of complexity is relative to the fact that we possess a consciousness of scientific systems other beings and objects in our world don't possess.
Overall, I thought that it was interesting that in order to recognize our own limitations in prediction, the author, as many others have done, creates this third, or next higher intelligence to explain the way we comprehend systems outside of ourselves. And that the idea is so alien to us (no pun intended)because we inevitablly place ourselves at the top of whatever system or classification we create.
If we assume that animals are unaware of humans' possession of consciousness, in relative terms, how many functions of animals, plant and objects must we be unaware of simply because we cannot begin to understand them?
I will be posting my response, but I thought you might be interested in this article.... Anthony
ReplyDeletehttp://dsc.discovery.com/news/2009/02/02/chimp-baby-smart.html
Baby Chimps Given Human Love Ace IQ Tests
Jennifer Viegas, Discovery News
Feb. 2, 2009 -- Orphaned infant chimpanzees that received attentive, nurturing care from human surrogate mothers were found to be more intellectually advanced than the average human baby when both groups were compared at the age of nine months, according to a new study published in the latest issue of Developmental Psychobiology.
The authors believe the study is the first to ever examine how different types of human care can affect the cognitive development and overall well being of infant chimpanzees.
"The early rearing environment is incredibly important for chimpanzee infants as it is for humans," co-author Kim Bard told Discovery News.
Bard, a professor of comparative developmental psychology at the University of Portsmouth, conducted the research with colleagues Marinus van Ijzendoorn, Marian Bakermans-Kranenburg and Krisztina Ivan.
he chimpanzee participants consisted of 46 male and female orphan infants that received either standard or responsive care from human surrogate mothers. Standard care met food and health needs, but provided no additional social and emotional nurturing from the caretakers, although the chimps had access to their primate peers.
Responsive care involved daily four-hour-long mom sessions, where the humans would play with the infant chimps, encouraging their motor development and communication skills while helping them to meet new challenges with curiosity instead of distress.
When the chimps were nine months old, they took an IQ test normally used to evaluate human infant development. Bard explained that typical items on the cognitive test required the chimps to "imitate scribbling on paper," look at pictures in a book as the examiner pointed to each one, and pick up a cup to find a block hidden underneath.
The infant chimps aced the test, even surpassing the scores of average human infants tested at the same age.
Follow-up studies on the chimpanzees are planned, but comparisons between humans and chimpanzees at later ages are complicated by the fact that the two primates interact with themselves and the world in different ways. Humans also define intelligence with our particular abilities as the yardstick.
"There are many domains of development, such as emotional, social, cognitive, communicative and motoric," Bard said. "Because of the differences in rearing or even cultural experiences, in interaction with development among these domains, it is difficult to pinpoint ages when 'the typical human' surpasses 'the typical chimpanzee.'"
She added, "Clearly the extensive linguistic ability of humans, and their ability to construct complex objects, such as the computer I'm using now, are beyond the capacity of chimpanzees."
Lisa Newbern of the Yerkes National Primate Research Center informed Discovery News that the chimpanzees were tested there, but only up until 1995, when the Yerkes Great Ape Nursery Closed.
"The NIH (National Institutes of Health) issued a breeding moratorium on chimpanzees that same year," Newbern said.
Bates explained that the current study "required extensive microanalysis and collaborative efforts" that resulted in the new paper.
Bates and her colleagues hope that conservation of African rainforests, along with "providing the best possible conditions" for chimpanzees at zoos and other places, will help them "to flourish in many different settings."
Van Ijzendoorn added that other studies on human babies suggest they can also excel or decline depending on the care they receive at this critical time of early life.
"At the moment, hundreds of thousands of orphans -- either social orphans abandoned by their parents or orphans who lost their parents because of AIDS (and other reasons) -- are raised in orphanages in Eastern European countries, Africa, China, India and elsewhere," he said, concluding that "enrichment of the environment in the orphanages can make a big difference in cognitive development, and we think also for emotional development."
Clifton Miller
ReplyDeleteThey idea of language among animals has been a reoccurring argument in each class discussion. We all agree that many animals have some ability to communicate simple actions, such as claiming territory, pain, or joy, but any thing above communication on a the most basic level is hard to define. The most convincing reason for the fundamental separation between animal communication and human language is the ability to form second order intentional systems. In writing essays the author wants the audience to believe the case he presents. Even if we state our opinions frankly, subconsciously many simple sentences are formulated as higher order intentional systems. The question then turns to whether or not there are animals that truly want their peers to believe what they communicate or the more likely scenario of peers reacting to communication without and vested interest on the others behalf.
Brian Nichols
ReplyDeleteThis week the readings were too much. The reading that I did get done was Deacon’s “The Symbolic Species” and “In Other Words.” These were interesting readings though. I felt that Deacon made a strong argument about the how “the evolution of language took place at the interface where cultural evolutionary processes affect biological evolutionary processes” (409). I believe that is logic makes sense when he proposes that symbolic thinking and language is a product of male and female matting relationships. In, fact, in a lot of ways, his essay answered the question why I never have a girlfriend because Deacon argues that mating relationships have always been a question of the male’s symbolic use of symbols to attract a female. The female then decides which male suitor is most fit to meet her and her offspring’s needs for food. The male’s courtship of the female, in a sense, becomes a social contract where the female and male agree to be monogamous while the male becomes the provider of meat for the female. It was interesting that Deacon also argued that this social contract was also recognized by other members of their social group. Especially, this is so because it normally took more that one hunter to capture meat. The other members of the group seem to agree to help with the gathering of food because it furthers their species.